

HYBRID WAR: IS THE U.S. ARMY READY FOR THE  
FACE OF 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY WARFARE?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

LARRY R. JORDAN, JR, MAJ, USA  
B.A., Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, 1992

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas  
2008

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. <b>PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.</b>					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 08-12-2008		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) AUG 2007 – JUN 2008	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Hybrid War: Is the U.S. Army Ready for the Face of 21 <sup>st</sup> Century Warfare?				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) JORDAN, JR. LARRY R., MAJ				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT In 2006, Hezbollah employed a new type of warfare that it had been perfecting for 24 years. Systematically, Hezbollah adapted its tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting its operations. This included continued emphasis on Information Operations, counter intelligence operations aimed at eliminating and flipping Israeli operatives in Southern Lebanon, and the infiltration of their own agents into Northern Israel. They moved toward conducting not only coordinated large unit operations but also focusing on the counter-insurgency spectrum of warfare. After six years of the "Long War" the Army bracing for persistent conflict for at least several more, the warning signs are apparent. It seems possible that many of the situations that befell the IDF leading up to the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah are on the horizon for the U.S. Army. One need only look at linkages between Hezbollah and U.S. potential adversaries, such as Iran and North Korea, as well as non-state actors, to see the need for the U.S. to learn from the IDF. Failure to do so could lead to catastrophic consequences in the event of a conflict. Is the Army ready for Hybrid War?					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Hybrid War, COIN, Emerging doctrine, Hezbollah, Campaign Design					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT  (U)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES  52	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ Larry R. Jordan, JR.

Thesis Title:

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Thesis Committee Chair  
Jackie D. Kem, Ph. D.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
Thomas G. Clark, Ph. D.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
Mr. Eric F. McMillin, M.A.

Accepted this 08th day of December 2008 by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Director, Graduate Degree Programs  
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

**HYBRID WAR: IS THE U.S. ARMY READY FOR THE FACE OF 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY WARFARE?**, by Larry R. Jordan, Jr., 52 pages.

In 2006, Hezbollah employed a new type of warfare that it had been perfecting for 24 years. Systematically, Hezbollah adapted its tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting its operations. This included continued emphasis on Information Operations, counter intelligence operations aimed at eliminating and flipping Israeli operatives in Southern Lebanon, and the infiltration of their own agents into Northern Israel.

They moved toward conducting not only coordinated large unit operations but also focusing on the counter-insurgency spectrum of warfare. After six years of the “Long War” the Army bracing for persistent conflict for at least several more, the warning signs are apparent.

It seems possible that many of the situations that befell the IDF leading up to the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah are on the horizon for the U.S Army. One need only look at linkages between Hezbollah and potential U.S. adversaries, such as Iran and North Korea, as well as non-state actors, to see the need for the U.S. to learn from the IDF. Failure to do so could lead to catastrophic consequences in the event of a conflict. Is the Army ready for Hybrid War?

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

An experience such as this is not just the job of a single person and requires the support, mentoring and sometimes the swift kick in the backside of a number of individuals. For without them the motivation to continue could easily wane. It is they that are responsible for the completion of this thesis.

I would first like to thank my thesis committee members, especially my committee chair, Dr. Jackie Kem. Thank you for the guidance you provided and the patience you displayed as we worked this endeavor to its logical conclusion. I will recall our early morning conversations fondly.

Finally, I would like that thank my wife Erika and children Noelle, Brandon, Shelbi, and Bella. It is their sacrifice that allowed me to undertake this project and without their support its completion would have never been possible.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE .....	1
ABSTRACT .....	2
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	3
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	4
ACRONYMS .....	6
ILLUSTRATIONS .....	8
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .....	9
Primary and Secondary Research Questions .....	10
Background .....	11
The Birth of Hezbollah .....	11
Hezbollah’s Sphere of Influence Grows .....	12
Operation Litani .....	13
Operation Peace for Galilee .....	14
Operation Accountability .....	15
Operation Grapes of Wrath .....	15
Foundations of the Hybrid War .....	16
The Second Lebanon War .....	16
CHAPTER 2 .....	19
REVIEW OF LITERATURE .....	19
Introduction .....	19
Hybrid War .....	20
How is Hybrid War Different? .....	22
What does current Army Doctrine say about Hybrid War? .....	23
Conclusion .....	25
CHAPTER 3 .....	26
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .....	26
Research Material .....	26
Thesis Framework Overview .....	26

Research Criteria.....	27
Conclusion .....	28
CHAPTER 4 .....	29
ANALYSIS.....	29
Hybrid War .....	29
Traditional War.....	30
Irregular War.....	30
Catastrophic War .....	31
Disruptive War.....	31
Development of Hybrid War .....	32
Roots .....	33
Hybrid War and Emerging Doctrine.....	35
Operational Problems .....	36
Problem Framing .....	39
PMESII-PT .....	40
COIN Design .....	48
Hybrid versus COIN .....	54
Conclusion .....	55
CHAPTER 5 .....	57
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS .....	57
Interpretations .....	58
Recommendations.....	58
Recommendations for Further Study .....	61
Conclusion .....	61
REFERENCE LIST .....	64
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .....	67

## ACRONYMS

AO	Area of Operation
AOR	Area of Responsibility
CACD	Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
COG	Center of Gravity
COIN	Counterinsurgency
DoS	Department of State
DoD	Department of Defense
EBO	Effects Based Operations
HME	Home-made explosives
HN	Host Nation
HOA	Horn of Africa
IDF	Israeli Defense Force
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
FOB	Forward Operating Base
LOE	Lines of Effort
LOO	Lines of Operations
MDMP	Military Decision Making Process
NMSP-WOT	National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism
NTC	National Training Center
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization



PMESII-PT	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical environment and Time
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PAVN	The People's Army of Vietnam
SBCT	Stryker Brigade Combat Team
SLA	South Lebanon Army
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SWEAT-MS	Sewers, Water, Electrical, Academics, Trash, Medical facilities and Security
UN	United Nation
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
USA	United States Army
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USAF	United States Air Force
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy
WMD/E	Weapons of Mass Destruction/Effects

## ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
Figure 1. The Hybrid Model of Warfare .....	20
Figure 2. Spectrum of Conflict and Operational Themes .....	24
Figure 3. Types of Problems and Solution Strategies. (TRADOC PAM 525-5-500).....	38
Figure 4. Range of Popular Support. (FM 3-24.2) .....	40
Figure 5. Comparing the counterinsurgent view to the insurgent view .....	42
Figure 6. Recommended adjusted focus for the counterinsurgent view. ....	43
Figure 7. Insurgent versus counterinsurgent view of time. ....	47
Figure 8. 3-2 Stryker BCT Arrowhead Ripper Campaign Plan .....	51
Figure 9. Iterative counterinsurgency long-range plan design .....	53

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

A terrorist underworld -- including groups like Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Jaish-i-Mohammed -- operates in remote jungles and deserts, and hides in the centers of large cities.

President George W. Bush  
2002 State of the Union Address

For thirty-three days in 2006, Hezbollah and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) fought what many have called the 2<sup>nd</sup> Lebanon War. Sparked by the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers, the conflict was unlike any that had taken place before, merging conventional weapons and tactics with guerilla tactics in the same battle space called Hybrid Warfare. For the purposes of this study, Hybrid War(fare) will be defined as the employment of the combination of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive tactics, techniques, and procedures in an effort to achieve success, across the full range of warfare: tactical, operational, and strategic.

This new type of warfare employed by Hezbollah was some 24 years in the making, beginning in 1982 and culminating in 2006. During this time the leadership of Hezbollah patiently observed and learned as the IDF gradually became more dependent upon precision technology to strike at targets throughout Southern Lebanon. Systematically, Hezbollah adapted its tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting its operations. This included continued emphasis on Information Operations, counter intelligence operations aimed at eliminating and flipping Israeli operatives in Southern Lebanon, and the infiltration of their own agents into Northern Israel.

During this time Israel continued to be considered one of the top, if not the premier, counter-insurgency force in the world. However, the IDF was becoming more

enamored with Air Power and precision strikes. They moved away from conducting coordinated large unit operations, focusing instead on the counter-insurgency spectrum of warfare as opposed to the full spectrum. After six years of the “Long War” and the Army bracing for persistent conflict for at least several more, the warning signs are apparent.

It seems possible that many of the situations that befell the IDF leading up to the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah are on the horizon for the U.S Army. One need only look at the linkage between Hezbollah and potential United States adversaries, Iran and North Korea, and see the need for the U.S. to learn from the IDF. Failure to do so could lead to catastrophic consequences in the event of a conflict.

#### Primary and Secondary Research Questions

Does current U.S. Army doctrine sufficiently addresses combat against adversaries in a Hybrid War scenario, regardless of whether they are state or non-state actors? With this research I intend to answer this question by answering several secondary research questions that are:

1. What is hybrid war and identify several of the primary characteristics?
2. How did hybrid war develop and is it truly a new phenomenon?
3. Have state or non-state actors effectively used hybrid war previously and what counter measures were employed against it successfully?
4. Does current or emerging United States Army doctrine identify a potential Hybrid conflict?

The two largest assumptions that are being made for this research are first, that the use of Hybrid War tactics is a deliberate choice and will continue to be used by both

state and non-state actors, as long as those techniques produce results. Secondly, the United States Army may not be prepared to fight an adversary, either state or non-state, that employs Hezbollah style Hybrid War tactics.

Three limitations currently exist. The first of these limitations is the relative newness of this topic. Hybrid War as a concept can be, in a sense, compared to the concept of Information Operations a few years ago. That is to say that no one can truly explain exactly what it is. This was viewed as a benefit as it allows for greater freedom of interpretation and greater potential for increased dialogue about the study. Second, this study will be limited to Army doctrine. The Marines as an organization have taken the lead as it pertains to doctrine and Hybrid War. However, this study will focus on the Army and that organization's readiness for this form of conflict. Finally, this study will contain unclassified information only.

### Background

#### The Birth of Hezbollah

Hezbollah emerged at the forefront of a number of groups that began a nearly twenty-year counterinsurgency fight with not only the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) but also the civilian populace of Israel. There were four primary mechanisms that lead to the emergence of the organization.

After Lebanon gained its independence on 22 November 1943, "Shia felt that they were the despised stepchildren of a state governed by a Maronite-Sunni alliance..." (Hamzeh, 2004). This caused a perceived identity crisis and persecution.

Second there was a structural imbalance caused by the National Pact of 1943. In this pact, Shiites were underrepresented within the government and military whose

positions were allocated proportionally based on the demographics of the country's recognized sectarian groups. Of the country's leadership positions, the Shia filled only 3.2 %. Additionally, numbering close to 1.4 million, the Shia community was among the poorest in the country and was forced to migrate to the slums and shantytowns of Beirut because of constant fighting between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in the Beqaa Valley region. These areas have been referred to as that "belt of misery" and became a feeder community for radical Shiite extremism during the 1980s (Hamzeh, 2004,14).

A combination of the first two factors coupled with the military defeat of the PLO in 1982 led to the issues of the third mechanism, military defeat. As the IDF attempted to eradicate the PLO, collateral Shia civilian casualties were high. The Lebanon War of 1982 greatly assisted in legitimizing Hezbollah and the organization's use of guerrilla tactics (Hamzeh, 2004, 15).

Finally, the third mechanism that led to the ultimate creation and acceptance of Hezbollah as a viable alternative in Lebanon for the Shia community was the success of the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution. The "long suffering Shiites were most receptive to Iran's Islamic revolutionary message and because of personal relationships that had been developed through shared trials and tribulations, Shia clerics in Lebanon were easily drawn to the cult of personality of Khomeini" (Hamzeh, 2004,17).

### Hezbollah's Sphere of Influence Grows

"For Allah is behind us supporting and protecting us while instilling fear in the hearts of our enemies."

"The Hizbollah Program"

1985 Manifesto

In February of 1985, Hezbollah officially declared its existence. In the first of many spectacular Information Operation Campaigns, Hezbollah simultaneously had The Hezbollah Program read by Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin at a West Beirut Mosque and published as “The Hezbollah Program, an open letter to all the Oppressed in Lebanon and the World” in al-Safir, a daily newspaper in Lebanon.

Hezbollah continued its attacks from 1983 to 1985 on the IDF. All the while Hezbollah claimed the Lebanese government was corrupt and the organization provided assistance to the local populace in the form hospitals, schools, and other municipal services much like a fully functional government. Providing for the Shia in Lebanon was something that the Lebanese government was unable or unwilling to do; Hezbollah’s dual pronged “attack” helped with its grass roots establishment and created a “Robin Hood” complex between the organization and Shia population.

### Operation Litani

Prior to the formation of Hezbollah, the seeds of dissent had been sown with the situation between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the IDF. In 1978, as a result of a bus hijacking by the PLO, the Israeli government launched a major ground offensive into southern Lebanon. The objective of the operation was to destroy terrorist training camps and staging areas. The operation lasted from 15-21 March 1978. On 19 March 1978, the United Nation Security Council adopted Resolution 425, that called for the removal of all Israeli forces from Lebanon and the establishment and insertion of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to serve as a peace keeping force in with the mission of establishing a buffer zone in South Lebanon and keeping terrorist out of the sector. In June, the government of Israel withdrew its troops without having

achieved its desired endstate of the removal of the PLO from the southern portion of Lebanon. This would sow the seeds for future conflict and the rise of Hezbollah.

### Operation Peace for Galilee

Since its failed attempt to remove the PLO from southern Lebanon in 1978, the northern settlements of Israel had been constantly bombed and shelled by the PLO. On 6 June 1982, in response to the attempted assassination of Shlomo Argov, their Ambassador to the UK, the Israeli government, led by Menachem Begin ordered the expansion of the pre-existing conflict with Lebanon. “Operation Peace for the Galilee” was launched in an attempt to protect the northern Israeli settlements from constant attack from the PLO. This successful Israeli military operation destroyed PLO terrorist training camps and infrastructure. Additionally, the IAF destroyed SAM sites in the Beqaa Valley and destroyed some 90 MIGs in air-to-air combat.

While the victory was sweet it was short lived as Israel created another, soon to be more lethal, adversary. Facing growing discontent with a large portion of their population, the IDF with assistance from a trained militia and the South Lebanese Army (SLA) began to patrol a Southern “security zone” in Lebanon. The intent behind this security zone was to protect the settlements in the northern part of Israel from the rocket attacks that had plagued it during the years of the PLO. However, not satisfied with the token withdrawal, and not wanting to have Israeli forces on its soil, Hezbollah continued to attack the IDF, SLA and Israeli civilian populace in Galilee. It was during this time that Hezbollah began to develop its doctrine for fighting and defeating a technologically advanced enemy. Through trial and error the organization adapted its original 13



principles of war, morphing them into a doctrine that would eventually confuse and astound the IDF.

### Operation Accountability

With years of practical experience and the suspected assistance of several nation-states, Hezbollah obtained conventional weaponry such as Katyusha rockets. The rockets rained down on northern Israel regularly with great effectiveness. Finally, in 1993, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin called for the complete destruction of Hezbollah. The operation named “Accountability” was based on artillery strikes from the IDF, and aerial and naval bombardments from the IAF and Israeli navy. The operation was a public relations blunder of tremendous proportions. Eventually Israel and Hezbollah negotiated a ceasefire. This negotiation only increased the stature of Hezbollah and emboldened the organization.

### Operation Grapes of Wrath

The cease-fire was broken in 1995 due to civilian deaths during an Israeli assassination of a high level Hezbollah fighter. Hezbollah resumed massive rocket attacks on Galilee promoting Operation “Grapes of Wrath.” Again this operation consisted of aerial and artillery bombardment with limited use of ground forces. Israel continued its shelling even once UN peacekeepers had been sent in to assist the Lebanese. The result of this shelling was the killing of 100 civilians under the protection of the UN; once again the world looked negatively on the actions of the Israelis.

## Foundations of the Hybrid War

These two conflicts had allowed Hezbollah to gather vital intelligence on the preferred operational methods of the IDF and adjust accordingly between May 2000 and July 2006. They continued to harass the IDF and settlements in Galilee as they prepared for the implementation of their new tactics. Hezbollah cunningly placed a deception plan in motion, building false bunkers and allowing false information to fall into the hands of the Israelis, while emplacing their actual bunkers in locations known to but a few. Simultaneously, they continued to improve and fortify their locations, making them resistant to Israeli bombardments in preparation for the next conflict.

It is suspected that massive amounts of training were provided to Hezbollah by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and a steady supply of weapons systems such as rocket propelled grenades, shoulder fired SAMs, Iranian made C-802 surface to ship missiles and Katyusha rockets made their way in to the hands of the military arm of the organization.

## The Second Lebanon War

12 July 2006 may wind up being a watershed date in the history of the Middle East. On this day a group of Hezbollah fighters killed three IDF soldiers and kidnapped two others. This act of war lead to what many are calling the Second Lebanon War. For 33 days the IDF battled Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon. However, Israel was to find out the rules under which they had been operating had been swept away and a new deadly contemporary operating environment now existed.

What the IDF found was that its effects based air campaign designed to target and destroy Hezbollah command and control, suspected bunker locations and supply

caches was ineffective. It was then that the IDF reluctantly mobilized for a ground incursion into Southern Lebanon.

Heavy fighting and the previously unseen form of complex web defense that was utilized by Hezbollah stunned world observers and made other militaries take notice. It seemed apparent that lack of unit training, large scale maneuver and cohesiveness outside the counter-insurgency spectrum of war over the last 20 years was beginning to take its toll on the IDF.

Hezbollah had morphed its organization into a more decentralized fighting force consisting of numerable cells all prepared to conduct operations and logistical re-supply independently. Hezbollah continued to push its IO message that was received in a fairly positive manner, while it seemed that Israel could do little to nothing right in the eyes of the international media.

As the UN cease-fire was implemented on 14 August 2006, some were claiming that the IDF had been defeated. While it is difficult to say that Hezbollah won the conflict of 2006, politically and militarily it did achieve its purpose of pushing the IDF out of southern Lebanon. Additionally, through successful Information Operations, Hezbollah was able to add to the suddenly tarnished image of the IDF. News reports and pictures of IDF soldiers in full retreat humiliated the military and nation and may be of grave concern for years to come.

The major significance of this conflict for the United States is obvious. For years, the nations of the world have seen the technological might of the U.S. Military. Operation Desert Storm and the “Shock and Awe” campaigning at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) were testaments to the vast capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces.

Clearly, near-peer competitor states and non-state actors will seek to reduce the advantages that the U.S. military currently enjoys, using both tradition and non-traditional military tactics. It is the merging of these military tactics into what has been called the Hybrid threat that I will examine in this paper.

The purpose of Chapter 2 is to present several of the sources used to assist my research when analyzing whether or not current U.S. Army doctrine sufficiently addresses combat against adversaries in a Hybrid War scenario, regardless of whether they are state or non-state actors. In this chapter I will attempt to define what Hybrid War is in regards to its origins, theories and viewpoints based on the beliefs of several of the leading proponents in this area. Secondly, I will examine how and why Hybrid War is different from the type of conflicts that the U.S. has faced before. This will be accomplished by explaining the blending of conventional and irregular war as employed by Hezbollah during their conflict with Israel in 2006. Finally, I will address emerging Army doctrine and its dynamic shift in thinking and the way it seeks to approach conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

## CHAPTER 2

### REVIEW OF LITERATURE

“Most enemies either do not try to defeat the United States with conventional operations or do not limit themselves to purely military means.... Instead they try to exhaust U.S. national will, aiming to win by undermining and outlasting public support.”

FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*

#### Introduction

The purpose of this research was to analyze whether or not current U.S. Army doctrine sufficiently addresses combat against adversaries in a Hybrid War scenario, regardless of whether they are state or non-state actors. Initially in this chapter, I will attempt to define what Hybrid War is in regards to its origins, theories and viewpoints based on the beliefs of several of the leading proponents in this area. Secondly, I will examine how and why Hybrid War is different from the type of conflicts that the U.S. has previously faced. This will be accomplished by explaining the blending of conventional and irregular war as employed by Hezbollah during their conflict with Israel in 2006. Finally, I will address emerging Army doctrine and its dynamic shift in thinking and the way it seeks to approach conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and whether current Army doctrine does or doesn't address Hybrid War. The objective of this research is to identify strengths and/or weaknesses in the current Army doctrine as it pertains to Hybrid War and provide recommendations, if any, for improvements.

## Hybrid War

For the purposes of this study, I will define Hybrid War(fare) as the employment of the combination of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive tactics, techniques, and procedures, including all elements of national power (Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic) in an effort to achieve success across the full range of warfare: tactical, operational, and strategic.

The origins of the term Hybrid War can be linked to Robert G. Walker who wrote in his Naval Post Graduate monolith, *Spec FI: The United States Marine Corps and Special Operations*, that Marines were a “hybrid force for Hybrid Wars.”




Figure 1. The Hybrid Model of Warfare

Walker talks of Hybrid War being a convergence of conventional and special operations as illustrated in Figure 1.

Later expanding upon this idea, Frank Hoffman wrote in his monograph *Conflict in the 21st Century: Rise of the Hybrid Wars* that he believes since the collapse of the Soviet Union, warfare in our time is ever changing. He puts forth the idea that “future contingencies will more likely present unique combinational or hybrid threats that are specifically designed to target U.S. vulnerabilities.”

A prime example of this can be seen in the conflict of 2006 between Hezbollah and Israel. Hezbollah demonstrated that a non-state entity was able to effectively target and attrit a technologically superior defense apparatus. However, it was not just the military that Hezbollah was able to fight. It seemed that at nearly every turn the leadership of Hezbollah were two steps ahead of the Israelis when it came to providing information and getting out “the story.” Lastly, because of the social programs that have long been a backbone of Hezbollah’s existence, it was much easier for them to provide essential service to the populace and thereby have a favorable effect on the diplomatic and economic elements of national power.

Hybrid War is not the sole domain of non-state actors such as Hezbollah, Hamas or Al Qaeda. In 1999, Colonel Qiao Liang and Colonel Wang Xiangsui of the People’s Liberation Army, wrote *Unrestricted War* in which they attempted to answer how a militarily “weak” country could engage in combat with and defeat a stronger country such as the United States. What they came up with was unrestricted war.

The two suggested that, “Unrestricted war is a war that surpasses all boundaries and restrictions. It takes military and nonmilitary forms and creates war on many fronts. It is the war of the future.” Cyber attacks, terrorism, and the fomenting of social decay were all “weapons” exposed for use.

In *Thinking about Modern Conflict: Hybrid Wars, Strategy, and War Aims*, Erin Simpson says that Hybrid Wars “are often characterized by elements of both civil and interstate wars.” She distinguishes herself from other scholars in that she concentrates more on war aims and strategies than state or non-state actors when characterizing Hybrid War.

### How is Hybrid War Different?

Hybrid warfare differs from all other forms of warfare in that it blurs the lines between conventional and irregular war. State or non-state actors will attempt to attack weaknesses or vulnerabilities of the United States. Again we look to Hoffman as he explains that Hybrid conflicts will cover the full spectrum of warfare. We can expect to see conventional and irregular tactics, techniques and procedures, all manner of terrorist acts targeting not only military but also the civilian populace and infrastructure, increased use of crime as a weapon system, emphasis placed on cyber war to include attacks against government, military and civilian computer network systems and continued exploitation of information and the use of media.

Some in the United States military apparatus have identified the need for change to face the perceived threat of Hybrid War. *A Cooperative Strategy for Maritime Security* represents this change. Put forth by GEN James T. Conway (USMC), ADM Gary Roughead (USN) and ADM Thad Allen (USCG) the new national maritime strategy exposes that “conflicts are increasingly characterized by a hybrid blend of traditional and irregular tactics, decentralized planning and execution, and non-state actors ... using both simple and sophisticated technologies in innovative ways.”



LCDR Ryan Carron discussed 4<sup>th</sup> Generation warfare (4GW) and Hezbollah in his paper *Hezbollah: Operational Art in Fourth Generation Warfare*. LCDR Carron points to the Lebanese Shia population as the Center of Gravity (COG) for Hezbollah. This is showcased by fact that Hezbollah has its own satellite television, Al-Manar, and radio Nur to assist with the organizations information operations. The ability to get one's message out in the most efficient and effective manner is an important aid in the swaying of the populace to your side.

#### What does current Army Doctrine say about Hybrid War?

Since 1999 we have been an Army in transition. General Eric Shinseki called for us to transform from what was termed the “legacy force” to the “interim force” centered on the medium weight brigade in the newly envisioned Army represented by a more lethal, highly deployable force capable of fighting across the entire spectrum of warfare.

Less than two years later we were again forced to change as the paradigm of conflict was forever altered with the onset of the Global War on Terror. Army doctrine was slow to change as we attempted to continue and apply conventional war fighting tactics, techniques and procedures to an enemy force that was clearing anything but.

Recently the Army published Field Manual FM 3-0, *Operations*. Coupled with FM 1, *The Army*, these two publications form the foundation for what the Army is about and how it should conduct its missions.

FM 3-0, *Operations*, drastically shifts the thinking of the Army from being focused primarily on offensive and defensive operations by placing stability operations




Figure 2. Spectrum of Conflict and Operational Themes

for the first time on even footing. Additionally, FM 3-0, *Operations*, attempts to visually depict a spectrum of conflict and operational themes that is commonly referred to as the “Tennessee Chart.” The chart shows the operational themes as separate entities or occurrences, seemingly not taking into account their potential convergence and the creation of Hybrid War. General Wallace, TRADOC commander, however, mentions in the foreword of FM 3-0 that the Army does recognize it is imperative to utilize all elements of national power in order to achieve victory in the “long war.”

Likewise, FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, attempts to explain the dichotomy of the military and non-military aspects of an insurgency and then the roles and responsibilities of the key participants in the counterinsurgency fight. The integration of civilian and military activities is quintessential to the success of the U.S. in the COIN fight. A combination of the expertise brought by the civilian contingent (political, economic, social and information) coupled with the military operations; both lethal and non-lethal

are needed in the ever evolving, complex and contemporary operating environment that faces the Army for the foreseeable future.

### Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to present several of the sources used to assist my research into analyzing whether or not current U.S. Army doctrine sufficiently addresses combat against adversaries in a Hybrid War scenario, regardless of whether they are state or non-state actors. In this chapter I attempted to define what Hybrid War is in regards to its origins, theories and viewpoints of several of the leading proponents in this area. Secondly, I examined how and why Hybrid War is different from what the U.S. has faced before. Here I explained the blending of conventional and irregular war as employed by Hezbollah during their conflict with Israel in 2006. Finally, I addressed emerging Army doctrine and its dynamic shift in thinking and the way it seeks to approach conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Chapter 3 will outline the framework and methodology that I will use to answer my primary research question.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

While there is a great deal of literature that exists on Hybrid War, it does not doctrinally address how the Army should conduct combat operations against adversaries in a Hybrid War scenario, regardless of whether they are state or non-state actors. In order to answer the research questions posed in Chapter 1, this modified case study will examine the body of work that currently exists on Hybrid War with an eye toward providing research, analysis, conclusions and recommendations on whether or not current U.S. Army doctrine sufficiently addresses combat against adversaries in a Hybrid War scenario, regardless of whether they are state or non-state actors.

#### Research Material

The previous chapter provides an understanding of the research documents that were used for this thesis. This study made extensive use of Army doctrine, both current and emerging. Additionally, a number of articles and books were from the leading subject matter experts were used to complete this study.

#### Thesis Framework Overview

To answer the primary and secondary questions the approach of this study will be divided into four separate areas to include: the defining of Hybrid War; explaining the development of Hybrid War and where it has been employed; discussion of the use of Hybrid War in an historical context referencing specific examples such as the PAVN

during the Vietnam conflict and Hezbollah during its conflict with IDF in 2006; and finally, analyzing current and emerge US doctrine concerning Hybrid War.

### Research Criteria

My thesis will begin with the explanation of Hybrid War. In order to avoid any possible confusion, it is vital to have a common understanding of how I will define Hybrid War throughout this thesis. Once this has been accomplished, I will attempt to examine the history of Hybrid War. This was done by uncovering the roots and evolution of Hybrid War as a form of conflict.

This thesis will then discuss the use of Hybrid War focusing primarily on the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict of 2006, but will also take into account other proxy forces and conflicts that may have been Hybrid War based or used elements of Hybrid War.

The IDF initially attempted to employ Effects Based Operations (EBO) methodology during the fight with Hezbollah. This thesis will attempt to identify how successful that methodology was and if the Army should utilize the same model when attempting to counter future Hybrid War adversaries. This will be done through the examining of current and emerging Army doctrine in an attempt to confirm or deny if that doctrine is written to facilitate Hybrid type wars.

Through the research and analyzing of the research that I will conduct, I hope to be able to answer my primary question: does current U.S. Army doctrine sufficiently addresses combat against adversaries in a Hybrid War scenario, regardless of whether they are state or non-state actors?

If the answers provided through the research prove a lack of tactics, techniques and procedures necessary to combat Hybrid War incorporated into doctrine, this thesis will make recommendations for changes.

### Conclusion

It is important to attempt to identify any shortfalls in Army doctrine when it comes to Hybrid War. The effective implementation of the research design in this chapter and the literature from Chapter 2 is important for the success of this thesis. The ability of the Army to defeat a future Hybrid War threat is tantamount to success in the conflicts of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Chapter 4 will take the literary review found in Chapter 2 coupled with analysis derived from the research design outlined in Chapter 3, to answer the primary and secondary questions of this thesis.

The following chapters will attempt to answer the primary and secondary research questions presented in Chapter 1. The conclusions that are arrived at form the foundation for the recommendations made to ultimately ensure that the Army has current or emerging doctrine that sufficiently addresses combat against adversaries in a Hybrid War scenario, regardless of whether they are state or non-state actors.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

The purpose of this thesis was to provide research, analysis, recommendations and conclusions on whether or not current U.S. Army doctrine sufficiently addresses combat against adversaries in a Hybrid War scenario, regardless of whether they are state or non-state actors.

This chapter analyzes Hybrid War in three steps. The first step is the analysis of how and where the concept of Hybrid War developed. The second step is the analysis of how current Army doctrine, specifically FM 3-24.02, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, and TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, *The U.S. Army's Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*, addresses Hybrid War. The third step is the analysis of whether the Army is prepared for a potential Hybrid War scenario regardless of whether the adversaries are state or non-state actors.

Below I will use current doctrine to define Hybrid War. The purpose of the following section is to describe the four threat categories in order to provide a basic understanding to the not only the individual, but also the hybrid complexities of threat methods. All definitions come from FM 3-0 with the exception on Hybrid War, which was defined for the purposes of this study in Chapter 1.

#### Hybrid War

For the purposes of this study, Hybrid War will be defined as the employment of the combination of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive tactics, techniques,

and procedures, in an effort to achieve success across the full range of warfare: tactical, operational, and strategic by either a state or non-state actor.

### Traditional War

In the loosest of terms, traditional war involves peer-to-peer or peer-to-near-peer competitors where two sides fight for the destruction of the other or the seizure of territory or resources. Examples of this type of warfare can be seen throughout history in such conflicts as World War I and II, the Falklands War and more recently Desert Storm and Phase I of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Each of these conflicts can be best characterized, as opposing nation states battling each other with similar military capabilities and having the expressed intent to impose a specific will or desired effect on the adversary (FM 3-0 *Operations*, 2008, 1-4).

### Irregular War

On 20 September 2005, the US Special Operations Command and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict hosted an Irregular Warfare Workshop for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the definition of Irregular War and operations and a list of activities that fell under the umbrella of Irregular War.

What they were able to agree upon was the definition as follows. “Irregular warfare is a war fighting philosophy that seeks to achieve strategic objectives by avoiding an adversary’s conventional military strength while eroding an adversary’s power and will, primarily through the use of indirect, non-traditional aspects of warfare.”



In contrast, the Army's capstone doctrine defines Irregular War as "including such means as terrorism, insurgency and guerilla warfare. Economic, political, informational, and cultural initiatives usually accompany and may even be chief means of Irregular attacks on the U.S." (FM 3-0 *Operations*, 2008, 1-4).

### Catastrophic War

The acquisition, possession and use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (CBRN) have become categorized as Catastrophic War (FM 3-0 *Operations*, 2008, 1-4). This battle is primarily fought within the domain of SOCOM. As tasked in the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism, SOCOM is to deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and increase the capacity for consequence management (NMSP-WOT, 2006).

Events such as the 1995 Sarin gas acts on the Tokyo underground railway, the 2001 U.S. anthrax attacks, and reports dating as far back as 1992 linking Osama Bin Laden and groups such as Al Qaeda to the attempted procurement of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (CBRN) show our enemies willingness to go to extreme measures to wreak havoc on society.

### Disruptive War

The American military is enamored with technological enablers that have for much of modern era of war provided an advantage over its adversaries. Understanding and adapting to this fact, the enemies of America and the West have attempted to negate those advantages through disruptive means linked to the development and employment of breakthrough technologies (FM 3-0 *Operations*, 2008, 1-4).

Use of the Internet by the enemy as a means of communication, movement of funds, and information operations are all current examples of ways in which developing and emerging technology are used by these organizations in an effort to defeat U.S. monitoring efforts.

However, we should consider not just new technology as disruptive, but rudimentary technologies as well. Home-made explosives (HME) and the use of ice and washer machine timers as triggering mechanism for rocket or IED attacks are all techniques that have been attempted to defeat U.S. military technological superiority on the battlefield.

It is through the merging of these four forms of war that Hybrid War has arrived and emerging doctrine has identified the subcomponents of the Hybrid War. This said, doctrine has not yet codified Hybrid War and how best to defeat it.

#### Development of Hybrid War

For close to two hundred years the American Army has been exposed to Hybrid War. Several examples of this type of conflict, combining two or more of the above mentioned characteristics are the French and Indian war, the American Revolution, the Spanish American War, the Civil War, the Philippine Insurrection, World War I, World War II, Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, Iran Hostage Crisis, Beirut, Somalia, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). While it is nearly impossible to pinpoint the exact genesis of Hybrid War, it is apparent that its coming out party, so to speak, took place against the United States during the Vietnam conflict.

Ironically, it can be theorized that the United States is somewhat responsible for the evolution of Hybrid War to its current state through participation in fighting against and supporting those employing early forms of postmodern era Hybrid War.

### Roots

While it is nearly impossible to pinpoint the exact genesis of Hybrid War, it is apparent that its coming out party, so to speak, took place against the United States during the Vietnam conflict.

The insurgent's cookbook for defeating a superpower was provided by military theorist Mao Tse Tung and employed with success in Vietnam. Vietnam saw a popular protracted people's war waged by both highly trained and untrained guerilla fighters.

The People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) was primarily trained and equipped by the military of the Soviet Union. Divided into several branches that included ground forces, a navy and coast guard, and an air force, the PAVN had proved capable of conducting major combat operations effectively.

Vietnam also received a large amount of support in the form of financing, materiel, training and safe haven from China and Russia in an attempt to counter American intervention. Additionally, the media and Information Operations played a huge role in undermining the actions in Vietnam and lead the eventual loss of popular support for the continuation of the conflict.

Vietnam would not be the last time that the U.S. military would encounter the changing face of war. During the 1982 Israel-PLO War in Lebanon, President Ronald Reagan deployed Marines to Beirut to oversee the withdrawal of the PLO in an attempt to bring about stability within that country. Serving in the capacity of peace keepers, the

Marines were continually engaged in combat while in Beirut, culminating in the October 1983 terrorist bombing and the killing of 241 Marines leading the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the city (Committee on International Relations, 2006, 5).

Somalia was yet another example of a hybrid form of war used against the U.S. in an attempt to wear down public support and political resolve. For perhaps the first time in the modern era, the U.S. was faced with conflict that involved non-state actors.

The Somali Warlords, such as Mohamed Farrah Aidid and others, who had taken control of the ungoverned regions of the country, became some of the first non-state actors that the military had to deal with. The militias, with assistance from outside terrorist organizations, believed to be under the umbrella of Al Qaeda, were able to keep a strangle hold on the country. Through the use of intimidation, including murder, kidnappings, seizing of humanitarian aid and direct attacks against U.S. Army units and other peace keepers, nothing took place within the country without the approval of the warlords (S/RES/775, 1992, 2).

Dealing with the warlords soon became extremely difficult and a number of IO blunders, would soon lead to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the country. The failure to provide a unified front caused not only by the transition of American political power at the highest levels, but also the replacement of the U.S. led headquarters with a U.N. headquarters provided a moment of opportunity for the warlords. This failure provided future adversaries yet another blueprint for success against the technologically superior U.S. Army (Crocker, 1985).

This was one of the first times that the military had to deal with individuals in control of a country who were not members of a duly recognized or established government or military.

Comparisons can be made between the aforementioned conflicts and what was experienced by IDF in Lebanon. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the fight between Hezbollah and the IDF has evolved for close to 26 years ending in what some believe to be the template for future war. Hezbollah began as a guerilla type organization and transformed into one of the world's most lethal hybrid organizations.

The military leadership of Hezbollah took an introspective look not only at themselves, but also the IDF and was able to transform into an adaptive and agile organization. An organization that was able to utilize predictive analysis to get inside their adversary's decision-making cycle. Instead of reacting to what IDF was doing to them, Hezbollah had achieved situational understanding of the battlefield to a degree far greater than the Israelis. This has become the blue print for the Army's 21<sup>st</sup> century enemy.

### Hybrid War and Emerging Doctrine

Does current U.S. Army doctrine sufficiently address combat against adversaries in a Hybrid War scenario regardless of whether they are state or non-state actors? The answer is currently no. However, in the October 2008 *Army Magazine*, Chief of Staff of the Army General George Casey wrote an article, *America's Army In an Era Of Persistent Conflict*, in which he says,

*“Hybrid threats—diverse, dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal capabilities—will make pursuit of singular approaches difficult,*

*necessitating innovative, hybrid solutions involving new combinations of all elements of national power.”*

In his statement General Casey began to scratch the surface of the complexities that face the Army as we move forward and experience 21<sup>st</sup> century combat, as witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The GWOT and the ever-changing operational environment have brought about a rapid transition in military affairs. This change occurs as our Army is in contact and more easily facilitates the capturing of tactics, techniques and procedure, lessons learned and best practices as experienced by those in combat. These findings are then transitioned to updated doctrine. A prime example of this is FM 3.0, *Operations*, the capstone document for the perceived future of combat operations across the full spectrum of warfare. However, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, *The U.S. Army's Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design (CACD)*, and the yet to be published FM 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, may hold the key to Army operations against a Hybrid threat and as so I will now examine several key portions of these publications.

### Operational Problems

“An operational problem is a discrepancy between the state of affairs as it is and the state of affairs as it ought to be that compels military action to resolve it” (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, *The U.S. Army's Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*, 2008, 8). Those discrepancies that do not require action are called concerns. An example to differentiate these two is the current situation in Africa. Failed states in Africa are potentially breeding grounds for the recruitment and training of extremists fighting against the United States and other western powers in the GWOT. It was not until the development of AFRICOM that this region became an operational problem (TRADOC

Pamphlet 525-5-500, *The U.S. Army's Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*, 2008, 8).

That said there are three forms of operational problems that currently face the Army. Well-structured problems reflect the National Training Center in the mid to late 1980's. Two opposing forces arrayed on opposite ends of a battlefield move toward one another intent on total annihilation. Well-structured problems are bedrock of modern Army doctrine. They are solved with lock step tactics, techniques, and procedures that are outlined in doctrine and if followed will lead to success when faced with this form of problem (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, *The U.S. Army's Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*, 2008, 9).

Next in the level of complexity are the Medium-structured problems. These problems a slight more difficult to solve as there is an add dimension, or wild card dynamic that must now be considered operationally. Building on the example of a conventional battle at NTC, a medium-structured problem would now add civilians on the battlefield. While this situation is not completely outside of the basic framework of Army doctrine, it still requires adaptations be made in order for the operation to be successful (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, *The U.S. Army's Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*, 2008, 8).

	<b>Well-Structured “Puzzle”</b>	<b>Medium-Structured “Structurally Complex Problem”</b>	<b>Ill-Structured “Wicked Problem”</b>
<b>Problem Structuring</b>	The problem is self-evident. Structuring is trivial.	Professionals easily agree on its structure.	Professionals will have difficulty agreeing on problem structure and will have to agree on a shared starting hypothesis.
<b>Solution Development</b>	There is only one right solution. It may be difficult to find.	There may be more than one “right” answer. Professionals may disagree on the best solution. Desired end state can be agreed.	Professionals will disagree on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How the problem can be solved.</li> <li>• The most desirable end state.</li> <li>• Whether it can be attained.</li> </ul>
<b>Execution of Solution</b>	Success requires learning to perfect technique.	Success requires learning to perfect technique and adjust solution.	Success requires learning to perfect technique, adjust solution, and refine problem framing.
<b>Adaptive Iteration</b>	No adaptive iteration required.	Adaptive iteration is required to find the best solution.	Adaptive iteration is required both to refine problem structure and to find the best solution.

Figure 3. Types of Problems and Solution Strategies. (TRADOC PAM 525-5-500)

The third and final of the operational problems is the Ill-Structured or “Wicked Problem” or more commonly referred to as the complex operational problem. These are the most asymmetric and difficult problems to solve and tend to produce a wide range of recommended solutions. The inability to come to a consensus on the solution to this problem is due to the fact that there is a lack of clear understanding as to what the problem truly is. Thus we have the complex operational problem as explained by Professor Horst Rittel in 1972, when he described the characteristics of socially complex problems as wicked in a “rather extremely difficult” way (Rittel, 1972).

The complex operational problem phenomenon can easily be seen in Iraq. There were a myriad of issues ranging from economic, governance, security, external influence, religious, essential services, and many others, all of which could be considered the root of the problem. The problem is which area do you attempt to fix first? Or do you attempt to apply solutions to multiple areas simultaneously? All must be considered while



potentially dealing with military threats, both conventional and unconventional, thus creating the Hybrid threat. Ask several professionals and they are most likely to each identify a different focus area and provide a compelling argument to support their decision. Most likely none of these individuals would be incorrect in their assessment, thus the conundrum of the complex operational problem. The figure above succinctly categorizes the structure, development of the solution, execution of the solution and adaptive iterations needed to addresses each of the three forms of problems.

### Problem Framing

When attempting to solve the complex operational problems discussed previously it is imperative to have an understanding of the environment in which you are going to operate. This can be accomplished through the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and planning model that has been shown to effectively assist commanders and staffs in the organization of their thought processes when a problem is well-defined. What happens when the complexity of a problem masks what the true problem is or how to best solve it? This is where framing the problem and the creation of a problem statement can greatly assist a commander and his staff in the identification of the problem that they intend to solve and provide potential guidance for mission accomplishment.

Framing the problem considers a multitude of variables into account to include, in no particular order; military, social, cultural, economic, political, religion and others. These variables will assist the commander and his unit in beginning to understand and visualize the design of their operation and lead to the identification of the true problems. There are multiple methods that can be used when attempting to frame the various forms of problems and dealing with the operational environment of counterinsurgency or

Hybrid War and its complexities. Of particular interest, as outlined in Chapter 1 of FM 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, are the operational variables of PMESII-PT.

### PMESII-PT

To better understand the area of operation/area of interest there are five tools that are believed to increase a unit's ability to defeat a counterinsurgency. Of these tools, PMESII-PT is one of the most comprehensive approaches for gaining situational understanding of a specific AO. Political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time are the eight variables commonly used to evaluate the operational environment. While each of the variables is individual and distinct in its own right, they are all interconnected and the effect that each has on the other varies based upon time and circumstance. Needless to say, no one variable is more important than the other.

When combating this threat it is important to understand that we are fighting for the support of the populace.




Figure 4. Range of Popular Support. (FM 3-24.2)

In the current fight against global terror, it can be said that the population falls along a bell curve where twenty percent will support the insurgency, another twenty percent will support the counterinsurgency and the remaining sixty percent begins uncommitted to varying degrees. A graphical depiction is shown above in Figure 4. It is

that portion of the population described as indifferent, and to an extent those located within the passive support zone, that are key to the success of both insurgent and counterinsurgent forces.

Insurgents utilize a myriad of methods to gain the support of the population. These methods traditionally include lethal techniques such as coercion through intimidation, killings and kidnappings. However, they are not the only tactics that have been used. Non-lethal approaches work as well, as has been successfully demonstrated by groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Social programs, medical assistance and information operations, all of which will be discussed later in this chapter are aspects that have assisted to swing a larger percentage of the population in favor of the insurgents.

It is for these reasons that it was vitally important to re-look how we as an organization are fighting in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. FM 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, examines approaches that we can take to combat the adaptive and agile foe that we currently face and while this piece of doctrine is written towards the counterinsurgency fight its basic principles can be applied to the Hybrid threat.

One of the primary goals of an insurgency is the struggle for political control. As a result it is imperative that there is unity of effort throughout all echelons of government. Any real or perceived lack of unity will be exploited by the enemy and viewed as weakness by the population.




Figure 5. Comparing the counterinsurgent view to the insurgent view

Figure 5 from FM 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, depicts the diametrically opposed focus areas emphasized by each side during the counterinsurgency fight. This graphical depiction begins to explain the need for a more integrated approach to combating the adversaries of the future but does not align the two ways of thinking.

A potentially better way for the Army to focus on operations is a more “fluid” view with a mix of military, interagency and host nation collaboration shown below in Figure 6. This graphic display the interconnectivity of all the agencies required to successfully combating counterinsurgency and the hybrid threat. The influence of each organization is measured over time. As pre-set and agreed upon conditions are met, the influence of each organization changes and the proponent for the lead for operations shifts as well. This allows for Army, interagency, and host nation collaboration from the beginning of operations and more readily synchronizes the focus of the counterinsurgent with that of the insurgent. This format is well suited and can be adapted for the hybrid fight as it allows for multi-echelon full spectrum integration and operations.




Figure 6. Recommended adjusted focus for the counterinsurgent view.

The military operational variable likewise is focused on not just enemy, but friendly as well. As operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines and the Horn of Africa (HOA) have shown, joint operations with indigenous security forces, ranging from army units to police forces and special operations units are now commonplace. In addition to the military-to-military relationships that most are familiar with, the Army must be prepared to forge alliances with militia organizations, even those that have not reconciled. Examples of this can be seen with the Anbar Awakening and the Sons of Iraq and the other groups such as 1920 in Baqubah. When operating with such organizations it is not important that all intermediate goals be exactly aligned. What is important is that there is a general understanding that both groups are working along the same lines toward a mutually agreeable endstate.

It is vital that as security is established, the Army, in conjunction with the host nation and other governmental agencies should assist in the invigoration of the host

nation's economy. A thriving economy helps to reduce animosity among the populace against the government and helps to decrease the number of individuals within the perceived indifferent demographic, illustrated in Figure 4, that may be accepting money to conduct attacks in order to provide for their family. By reducing potential feelings that the government has failed to provide the opportunity for an acceptable standard of living, counterinsurgency forces move toward the endstate to eliminate a critical vulnerability insurgents exploit.

As mentioned previously, social aspects play a large role in the operational environment. Most units' areas of operations have a diverse make up across ethnic, religious, tribal, and socio-economic lines. Mapping of the civilian considerations is of the utmost importance. Insuring that a unit has situational understanding of the human dimension of your area of responsibility allows commanders to be confident in the operational decisions that are made and facilitate a unit's understanding of second and third order effects that may take place as a result of cultural beliefs and traditions that exist within your AO.

FM 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, defines information as the collection, use, manipulation, distribution, and reliance on data, media, and knowledge systems – both civilian and military – by the global and local communities. For some time the Army has been behind the power curve when it came to information operations. The responsiveness of Information Operations Campaigns for the Army was filled with bureaucratic red tape and took entirely too long as compared to the process that our adversaries experienced. Additionally, an institutionalized mistrust of the media by the Army stemming from the Vietnam War, led to mistrust, misunderstanding and a general

lack of knowledge about what might be the best way to leverage all forms of media in order to get an effective story to the public. Our foes have displayed a great proclivity for information operations as demonstrated by their effective use of the Internet as a tool for propaganda, a secure location to transfer financial resources, and a means by which to pass operational target information.

One of several initiatives employed by the Army includes embedded and pool reporters with units in an attempt to break down barriers that currently exist between the media and Army. The embed program allows for a shared experience to take place between the military and the media, allowing the “veil of misunderstanding” to be more easily lifted and, hopefully, to develop a common perspective shared by both parties.

This of course can be a double-edged sword as the organization is now open to close scrutiny for any mistakes or missteps that may occur. However, as we seek to obtain the moral high ground in the fight with our enemy, being first with the truth, regardless of whether it is positive or negative information, has merit and lends credibility to what we are trying to accomplish.

In an attempt to change the anti-media culture within the field grade officer ranks, LTG William Caldwell, IV has designed a strategic communications requirement for all Majors attending Intermediate Level Education at the Command and General Staff College. This program tasks the officer to complete several requirements to include submitting an article for professional publication, conducting an interview with the print, radio or television media, creating a blog and finally conducting a public speaking engagement. From personal experience I can say that this program has proved to increase a sense of trust and created a greater feeling of ease as I interacted with media

professionals. Through continual exposure to media type situations while in a school or training environment, soldiers are prepared to deal with the media when on the battlefield. Both the embeds and the strategic communications program at ILE are ways that assist the Army as it attempts to obtain a better understand of information as a weapon system on the battlefield.

Basic facilities and services required in order for a society to properly function make up the infrastructure variable and are categorized as sewers, water, electrical, academic, trash, medical facilities and security (SWEAT-MS). These basic necessities when functional increase the standard of living of a community exponentially. It is with these sub-divisions that infrastructure is measured. By analyzing SWEAT-MS and assigning a red, amber, green status, units should be able to determine what short falls or surpluses are present in the different portions of their AORs and design plans in conjunction with the other variables that are tailor made for each area. Improvement of the standard of living is again an effective way to potentially decrease the influence that can be exerted on the populace by insurgent groups.

The physical environment is the most easily recognizable of the operational variables. This variable is comprised of not only the physical terrain within the AO but also the weather and its effects on the friendly forces, insurgents and the population as a whole. It is easy to understand that there will be subtle difference in how operations are conducted from a friendly prospective in a rural environment vice an urban one. We must look not only at ourselves, but the impact that variations in topography and weather have on the enemy and the population in general, understanding that not all urban or rural



areas are the same. Operations that may work in the sprawl of Mosul may not be as successful in Najaf or Baghdad.

Time is the last of the operational variables. Again, as with political, time is viewed in vastly different light if you look at it from the various prospective of population, the counterinsurgency and the insurgency.




Figure 7. Insurgent versus counterinsurgent view of time.

Figure 7 from FM 3-24.2 depicts this discrepancy in the viewpoint of time. The cultural make up of Americans includes the desire for immediate gratification; as such the Army likes to identify the problems and instantly set out to solving them. Coupling this with the short attention span of most of the American population, it is easy to see why short-term approaches are the *norm de jour*.

Quite to the contrary, most eastern cultures tend to look long term at solving problems and have applied this same approach to campaigns against America. Our

enemies have learned from observation of our actions in Vietnam, Beirut, and Mogadishu, just to name a few, that if they can carry on a conflict just long enough, our cultural tolerance for prolonged conflict will reach its limit and they will have a better chance of succeeding in their cause. With the average insurgency lasting eight years, it is easy to see how culturally these types of operations play into the hands of our adversaries (FMI 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, 3-22).

Individually each of the operational variables provides a plethora of information; it is, however, the blending of all eight that enables an organization to understand their AOR and move past the surface of an insurgency. This is the “so what,” or the ability of units to move beyond those observations that are obvious and move toward the identification of the graduate level issues that are needed in order to allow us to conduct predictive analysis and begin to get inside the enemy’s decision making cycle. It is my belief that utilization of these variables not just in the counterinsurgency fight, but also across the full spectrum of operations, allows the Army to better prepare itself to handle potential hybrid threats.

### COIN Design

Chapter 5 of FMI 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, discusses the tactical planning process and its use of tactical design and targeting as methods to better facilitate success in the COIN environment and it ties in well with the CACD. It is important to understand that there are seven lines of effort (LOE) in the COIN environment: establish civil security, establish civil control, support Host Nation security forces, restore essential services, support economic and infrastructure development, support governance and conduct information tasks. There is a linking between the PMESII-PT mentioned in

Chapter 1 of FMI 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, and the LOEs in Chapter 5.

Additionally, CACD outlines four principles that should be used to guide units as they prepare for campaign planning and execution. These principles are used to establish parameters by which a unit can begin to frame its operational design.

The first of these four campaign tenets states that it is the cognitive function of the commander to translate permissive and ambiguous strategic or operational guidance into the types of carefully articulated orders that direct successful tactical actions. It is my opinion that this is ideally suited for a mission command type leader, an individual who is comfortable receiving mission and intent from higher, digesting it and then providing the same to his subordinates. This decentralized command philosophy encourages disciplined initiative and rewards free thinking, agile and adaptive leaders and allows for units to more quickly react to the ever-changing operational environment. A mission type commander enables leaders to better obtain situational understanding of their environment by encouraging them to be concerned about second and third order effects that will occur weeks or potentially months in the future as a result of current operations, not just what is happening at this time or place.

Tying into the ability to anticipate those second and third order effects is the second tenet of campaign design which stipulates that the planning horizon of the operational design should extend to the achievement of the strategic or operational endstate at the conclusion of the campaign. An example of this tenet is the design for the Arrowhead Ripper Campaign Plan. In this plan, information operations were integrated throughout all the other elements of the campaign plan, and as a result served as the foundation or the background to the other four lines of effort (Figure 8). As mentioned in

the CACD, the planning horizon is shown as the dashed green objective. The brigade leadership wanted to illustrate what the ultimate endstate was for Diyala province and Baqubah, and impress upon subordinates that even though the Brigade was not going to be in country at the time that the objectives would be met, every LOE and all the operations that were conducted by the unit in support of those LOEs were a catalysts for successfully reaching the endstate by 3-2 SBCT for operations in Diyala province, specifically, Baqubah from June-September 2007. As graphically depicted below, the brigade attempted to solve the complex operational problems in Baqubah along five LOEs. The staff in coordination with COL Steve Townsend, the BDE commander, identified security as the main effort, followed by transition of authority as supporting effort 1. Supporting effort 2 was governance and essential services identified as individual LOEs to begin with and later as conditions were met merging into a combined line. As previously described, the fifth LOE, information operations, was pervasive through all the others and as a result served as the foundation or the background to the other four. As mentioned in the CACD, the planning horizon is shown as the dashed green objective. The brigade leadership wanted to illustrate what the ultimate endstate was for Diyala province and Baqubah, and impress upon subordinates that even though the Brigade was not going to be in country at the time that the objectives would be met, every LOE and all the operations that were conducted by the unit in support of those LOEs were a catalysts for successfully reaching the endstate.




Figure 8. 3-2 Stryker BCT Arrowhead Ripper Campaign Plan

Third is the fact that the complexity of the situation and the duration of the campaign make learning and adapting essential for achieving operational goals. It is an unrealistic expectation for a commander or his unit to have complete situational understanding of the AOR at the beginning of operations. Through self-study and exchange of vital information from previous land owning units during the RIP/TOA period, a unit should attain partial situational awareness of their AO. While this may be sufficient to begin operations, it is imperative for the new unit to gain situational understanding. This is accomplished over time and by framing the problem utilizing several different techniques, of which, PMESII-PT, was discussed previously.

Finally, effective campaigning must implement and encourage a comprehensive approach to problem solving. Defined as unified action, it is of the utmost importance that the “collaborative planning model” synchronize the resources and capabilities of not

only the various service branches, but also those of other governmental agencies and coalition partners. It is this amalgamation of institutional knowledge that is brought from different perspectives that could best allow for a campaign design that will efficiently and effectively target our adversaries in the future hybrid threat scenario.

While the campaign tenets can be considered the foundation for designing of LOE/LOOs, there are five supporting requirements, as listed in FM 3-24.2 *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, that are integral to the success of COIN design. These five requirements are:

1. U.S. and HN military commanders and the HN government together must devise the plan for attacking the insurgents' strategy and focusing the collective effort to bolster or restore government legitimacy.

2. HN forces and other counterinsurgents must establish control of one or more areas from which to operate. HN forces must secure the people continuously within these areas.

3. Operations should be initiated from the HN government's areas of strength against areas under insurgent control. The HN must retain or regain control of the major population centers to stabilize the situation, secure the government's support base, and maintain the government's legitimacy.

4. Regaining control of insurgent areas requires the HN government to expand operations to secure and support the population. If the insurgents have established firm control of a region, their military apparatus there must be eliminated and their politico-administrative apparatus rooted out.

5. Information tasks must be aggressively employed to accomplish the following:

- Favorably influence perceptions of HN legitimacy and capabilities.
- Obtain local, regional, and international support for COIN operations.
- Publicize insurgent violence.
- Discredit insurgent propaganda and provide a more compelling alternative to the insurgent ideology and their narrative.




Figure 9. Iterative counterinsurgency long-range plan design

If we take the seven LOEs and wrap the COIN design around them, the combination of all would lead to the identification of the purpose of our operations. Then by incorporating the Influence/Time chart (Fig. 6), coupled with the Insurgent/Counterinsurgent timeline chart (Fig. 7), we would be able to examine and determine from multiple aspects what agency is conducting what operation along which LOE at what time or phase of the counterinsurgency and apply a conceptually holistic approach to the fight against the hybrid threat.

### Hybrid versus COIN

The distinction between what is Hybrid and what COIN is subtle when looking at it from the surface. Joint Publication 1-02 defines COIN this way: Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02). The main objective in of any COIN operation is legitimacy (FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, 2006, 1-21). For the purposes of this study, Hybrid War has been defined as the employment of the combination of traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive tactics, techniques, and procedures in an effort to achieve success across the full range of warfare: tactical, operational, and strategic by either a state or non-state actor. This definition allows for COIN to be utilized when combating a Hybrid threat, but COIN operations alone are not sufficient to meet the total threat posed by Hybrid War. As the definition states, Hybrid War tactics are not just limited to insurgents and methods of insurgency. It is possible, and highly likely, that peer or near-peer competitors could choose to use insurgency tactics in combination with other methods of warfare and targets when fighting the United States. Proof of this fact was evident in 1999 with the publication of *Unrestricted War* by Colonel Qiao Liang and Colonel Wang Xiangsui of the People's Liberation Army. The Colonels proposed attacking America and the West in an indirect manner by economically targeting corporations, specifically mentioning Microsoft. Financially, the Euro was the currency that drew the most attention from the officers (Qiao, 1999, 4). It is this type of forward thinking by our potential adversaries that adds to the complexity of Hybrid War and separates it from fighting only a COIN fight.



## Conclusion

In this chapter I attempted to provide research, analysis, conclusions and recommendations on whether or not current U.S. Army doctrine sufficiently addresses combat against adversaries in a Hybrid War scenario, regardless of whether they are state or non-state actors.

This chapter analyzed Hybrid War, how and where it developed, what were the tactics employed by IDF during the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah in an attempt to defeat it and were they successful, and how did current and emerging Army doctrine, specifically FM 3.24.02 *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, and TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, *The U.S. Army's Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*, in addition to real world application, address Hybrid War and finally was the Army prepared for a potential Hybrid War scenario regardless of whether the adversaries are state or non-state actors.

With this research I attempted to identify several of the primary characteristics of Hybrid War, to identify how this type of warfare was developed and has it been used prior to 2006, examine the manner in which it was effectively used by Hezbollah against the IDF and compare what is being written in emerging United States Army doctrine and identify whether it addresses a potential Hybrid conflict. I have found that there is a growing disparity between current Army doctrine and the face of warfare in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Recent operations during the GWOT, specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan have in many ways shown this to be true. Does current U.S. Army doctrine sufficiently addresses combat against adversaries in a Hybrid War scenario, regardless of whether they are state or non-state actors?

After concluding the research my answer is “no,” but we seem to be well on the way to publishing doctrine that will address the issue. The purpose of this thesis was to provide research, analysis, conclusions and recommendations on whether or not current or emerging U.S. Army doctrine sufficiently addresses combat against adversaries in a Hybrid War scenario, regardless of whether they are state or non-state actors. In the following chapter I will attempt to take research, analysis, conclusions and recommendations provided in this thesis and provide a greater understanding of where the Army stands concerning Hybrid War thereby achieving the ultimate goal of answer whether or not current or emerging U.S. Army doctrine sufficiently addresses combat against adversaries in a Hybrid War scenario, regardless of whether they are state or non-state actors? This will be demonstrated through discussion of my interpretations derived from the analysis of the research, recommendations for the best way to integrate current and emerging doctrine for practical application in the contemporary operational environment, and finally recommended areas for further study.

## CHAPTER 5

### RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

With this research I attempted to identify several of the primary characteristics of Hybrid War, to identify how this type of warfare was developed and has it been used prior to 2006, examine the manner in which it was effectively used by Hezbollah against the IDF and compare what is being written in emerging United States Army doctrine and identify whether it addresses a potential Hybrid conflict. I have found that there is a growing disparity between current Army doctrine and the face of warfare in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Recent operations during the GWOT, specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan have in many ways shown this to be true. Does current U.S. Army doctrine sufficiently addresses combat against adversaries in a Hybrid War scenario, regardless of whether they are state or non-state actors?

After concluding the research my answer is “no,” but we seem to be well on the way to publishing doctrine that will address this issue. This thesis provided research, analysis, conclusions and recommendations on whether or not current or emerging U.S. Army doctrine sufficiently addresses combat against adversaries in a Hybrid War scenario, regardless of whether they are state or non-state actors. This chapter will discuss interpretation derived from the analysis of the research, recommendations for the best way to integrate current and emerging doctrine for practical application in the contemporary operational environment, and finally recommended areas for further study.

### Interpretations

In the analysis of current doctrine it was hard to find any specific mention of Hybrid War. A majority of our doctrine is written to address conventional combat and is primarily focused on the well-structured problem. Emerging doctrine such FMI 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*, dated 17 November 2008 does scratch the surface of the ill structured problem. This manual uses FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, and FM 90-8, *Counterguerrilla Operations*, as its foundation. Focusing on COIN LOEs, the concept of Clear-Hold-Build, the importance of population security, planning horizons, and tools for categorizing insurgents, this manual contributes toward combating a major component of the hybrid threat. However, we continue to grapple with complex operational problems that seem to be the modus operandi for the future of our Army's adversaries. In the increasingly complex operational environment in which we currently operate, it continues to become more difficult for military professionals to come to a common understanding or agreement on the exact nature of the problem set we face and how best to solve it. A document that attempts to address this issue is TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, *The U.S. Army's Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*.

### Recommendations

Based upon the analysis of current and emerging doctrine, changes are needed to better prepare the Army for Hybrid conflict. While a foundational approach for combating Hybrid War can be gleamed from portions of the Army's existing COIN doctrine, this change could be best implemented by continuing to examine and update doctrine while attempting to merge it with the campaign design framework that is outlined in the CACD and with the assistance of other governmental agencies and the

private sector. This would require far greater civil-military integration than currently exists between our organizations. An example of this increased integration would be the creation of a civil-military working group comprised of uniformed military and three to five civilians. It would be mandatory to have a Department of State subject matter expert within the group and an additional two to four members selected with experience and or knowledge of other government agencies based upon need. Brought together several months prior to a unit's deployment, this cell would work for the commander and attempt to solve the complex problems from both a military and political viewpoint. Subject matter expertise provided by civilian members of the panel would help to focus the military members on the socio-political second and third order effects caused by the operation. Additionally, this working group could provide valuable insight and knowledge pertaining to those non-traditional military areas of operation such as infrastructure and essential services repair, economic stimulus, and governance thereby further assisting in the development of realistic and obtainable goals along the LOE and in support that the campaign design.

The creation of these cells could be somewhat problematic due to personnel and financial constraints. Many government agencies struggle to fill their personnel slots and could ill afford to provide individuals for the required billets within each of the deploying unit's cells. A second potential roadblock could be the fact that the procurement of funds to support this endeavor may not be easily obtained. The current economic situation requires that politicians become even better stewards of the taxpayer's dollars and financial backing for a program such as this might not currently exist. A potential work around for both issues is the assignment of Army personnel to government agencies

outside of Department of Defense. This program would provide more personnel than current programs such as White House or Congressional Fellowships. I recommend primarily maneuver, fires and effects officers serve on this utilization tour for 12-18 months after key and developmental time as a field grade officer. However, it is vital that members of the other functional areas are afforded an opportunity to serve in these tours in order to diversify the knowledge base throughout the Army's formation. This short-term solution has potential long-term benefits. The officer serving in the position is able to interact on a daily basis with members of an outside agency and thereby gaining a great understanding of the cultural within that organization. This will help both organizations break down barriers, de-bunk long held myths and remove misnomers. Additionally, relationships are cultivated making it easier at later dates for the organizations to interact with one another. Upon completion of his assignment, the knowledge that the officer has gained is brought with him back to the operational Army where it can then be put to use in follow-on assignments.

Short of creating the working group and a formalized utilization tour, it is vital for commanders to leverage the members of their staffs and units. A way for a unit to gain some of the requisite knowledge to address the wicked problems presented in Hybrid War scenarios is through interaction with governments and municipalities around the installation. While not as ideal as the utilization tour concept, this interaction allows the staff to gain a greater understand and knowledge of the various aspects of campaign design and the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> order effects that can stem from military operations in today's environment. Incorporating these recommendations and approaching the update of doctrine by merging FMI 3-24.2 and TRADOC PAM 525-5-500 will facilitate a better

understanding within the Army of the more complex problems that face our force in the future.

### Recommendations for Further Study

This study focused on the Army and if it was doctrinally prepared for hybrid conflicts. During research and analysis two areas for further study became apparent: the role of other military forces in combating the Hybrid threat; and is there a synchronized Department of Defense strategy for combating the Hybrid threat?

The first area is partially addressed by COL (R) Frank Hoffman of the USMC who has written that the USMC is the force of choice for combating the Hybrid threat. In *Conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Rise of the Hybrid War* Hoffman writes that the Marines already “have the doctrinal basis and organizational flexibility to excel in hybrid conflict.” While this may in fact be the case, each of the services plays their own role in defeating the hybrid threat. Along this line there are two areas for further study. First, the role of the Navy and Air Force as it pertains to the Hybrid threat deserves further examination. However, perhaps most important and the area that needs to be studied further in depth, is how to best synchronize and employ all services when combating Hybrid threats.

### Conclusion

The current state of doctrine is neither effective nor efficient when it comes to fighting against the Hybrid threat. Because of its very nature, doctrine will always be step behind the current trends of human conflict. This is a result of a flexible and adaptive enemy who refuses to fight to our strengths and instead attacks our weaknesses thus

causing us to approach full spectrum conflicts in a manner that the military is not traditionally accustomed. In order to be successful, today's soldiers must be well versed in not only conventional and unconventional forms of warfare but also their hybrid mix. For years Army doctrine willingly chose to place little instructional emphasis on unconventional war, focusing instead solely on major combat operations. As a result, a vast majority of doctrine was centered on this single spectrum of war leaving the unconventional to the realm of the Special Operation Forces. As the events of the GWOT began to unfold it became increasingly apparent that our enemies were no longer going to fight the way we expected or wanted them to. Fortunately, the Army has begun to move to solving this problem through emerging doctrine.

The fight of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century is not just a fight conducted by the uniformed military, but instead will require the active involvement from a cross-section of government organizations in a "comprehensive approach." It may be necessary for the Army or other Services within DOD to act as the lead agency during the initial stages of a conflict; however, it is necessary that all parts of government do their share of the heavy lifting. Eventually as time passes and agreed upon pre-conditions are met, a transition will need to take place from one department to another and the focus then changes from presumably the Army, with support from DOD, in the lead to DOS, with Host Nation assistance in the lead. It is only through the collaborative planning of a fused civil-military team that this transition can be effectively planned and executed.

It is only with the continued evolution of doctrine away from a major combat operations centric mindset that we will be able to effectively and efficiently train, equip



and prepare our Army for combat against what in many respects could be the most lethal enemy that we have yet to face – the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Hybrid warrior.

## REFERENCE LIST

- Allison, Graham. 2004. *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*. New York: Times Books.
- Crocker, Chester A. 1995. "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong." *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 74, Number 3.
- Exum, Andrew. 2006. *Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment*. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, no. 63.
- Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. 2004. *In the Path of Hizballah*. New York: Syracuse University Press.
- Helmer, Major Daniel Isaac. 2007. "Not quite counterinsurgency: A cautionary tale for U.S. forces based on Israel's operation change of direction." *Armor*.
- Helmer, Major Daniel Isaac. 2007. *Flipside of COIN: Israel's Lebanese Incursion Between 1982-2000*. The Long War Series, no. 21. United States Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute Press. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
- Hoffman, Frank G. 2006. "Lessons from Lebanon: Hezbollah and Hybrid Wars." *Defense News*.
- Hoffman, Frank G. 2007. *A Conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, Virginia. December.
- Inbar, Efraim. 2007. "How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War." *Middle East Quarterly*, Summer.
- Katz, Samuel. 2002. *Battleground: Fact and Fantasy in Palestine*, Revised Edition, Taylor Productions, New York.
- Kober, Avi. 2006. The Second Lebanon War. *The Begin-Sadat Center For Strategic Studies Perspectives Paper* no. 22. 22 September.  
<http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/perspectives22.html>
- Matthews, Major Matt M. 2008. *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*. The Long War Series, no. 26 United States Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute Press. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
- Nakhleh, LTC Hany T, Lebanese Army. 2007. *The 2006 Israeli War On Lebanon: Analysis and Strategic Implications*. United States Army War College, Carlisle Barrack, PA.

- Peters, Ralph. 2006. "Lessons From Lebanon: The New Model Terrorist Army." *Armed Forces Journal*.
- Qiao, Liang and Wang Xiangsui. 1999. *Unrestricted Warfare*. Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House.
- Rittel, Horst H. 1972. *On Planning Crisis: System Analysis of the First and Second Generation*. University of California, Berkley  
[http://www.csun.edu/~vasishth/Rittel-Planning\\_Crisis.pdf](http://www.csun.edu/~vasishth/Rittel-Planning_Crisis.pdf) (accessed 12 October 2008).
- Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. 2006. *Hizbollah's Outlook in the Current Conflict Part One: Motives, Strategy, and Objectives*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal. 2006. *Hizbollah's Outlook in the Current Conflict Part Two: Accommodating Diplomacy and Preparing for the Postwar Context*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Schad, CPT Andrew, USAF. 1999. *Lebanon's Hizbollah Movement: The Party of God*. University of Arizona, Department of Near East Studies. Masters of Arts
- United States Army. 1986. Field Manual (FM) 90-8, *Counterterrorism Operations*. Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office.
- United States Army. 2005. Field Manual (FM) 5-0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*. Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office.
- United States Army. 2006. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*. Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office.
- United States Army. 2006. Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-07.22, *Counterinsurgency Operations*. Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office.
- United States Army. 2008. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*. Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office.
- United States Army. 2008. Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations*. Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office.
- United States Army. 2008. Field Manual Interim (FMI) 3-24.2, *Tactics in Counterinsurgency*. Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office.
- United States Army. 2008. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500, *Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design*. Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office.

- United States House of Representatives. 2006. *Hezbollah's Global Reach*. Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation and the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 109<sup>th</sup> Congress, Second Session. Washington D.C. Government Printing Office.  
<http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/30143.pdf> (accessed 28 September 2008)
- United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2006. *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism (NMSP-WOT)* Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Staff, Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office.
- United Nations Security Council. 1992. *RESOLUTION 775*. United Nations, New York, N.Y.

## INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library  
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College  
250 Gibbon Ave.  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Dr. Jackie D. Kem  
DJMO  
USACGSC  
100 Stimson Avenue  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Dr. Thomas G. Clark  
CTAC  
USACGSC  
100 Stimson Avenue  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Mr. Eric F. McMillian  
DJMO  
USACGSC  
100 Stimson Avenue  
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301